Today’s Legal Updates

Tuesday, 15th March 2022



Right to Constitutional Remedies

Article – 35 Legislation to give effect to the provisions of this Part

Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,—
(a) Parliament shall have, and the Legislature of a State shall not have, power to make laws—
(i) with respect to any of the matters which under clause (3) of article 16, clause (3) of article 32, article 33 and article 34 may be provided for by law made by Parliament; and
(ii) for prescribing punishment for those acts which are declared to be offences under this Part; and Parliament shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Constitution, make laws for prescribing punishment for the acts referred to in sub-clause (ii);
(b) any law in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution in the territory of India with respect to any of the matters referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) or providing for punishment for any act referred to in sub-clause (ii) of that clause shall, subject to the terms thereof and to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under article 372, continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by Parliament.
Explanation.—In this article, the expression “law in force” has the same meaning as in article 372.

Parliament Session

The second day post recess of the ongoing Budget Session of Parliament saw replies on issues ranging from tyres companies being fined for cartelisation, crimes against transgenders, YouTube news channels and URLs blocked by the government, and more.

Banning of media channels, content

Q.  The Lok Sabha by Congress Member of Parliament from Kerala’s Thrissur ask question on Banning of media channels and its content.

A. Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting Anurag Thakur revealed that under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, between 2014 and 2021, 25,368 URLs have been blocked, The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has issued directions for blocking of 56 YouTube based news channels and their social media accounts for public access during 2021-2022.

Inter-operable Criminal Justice System

Union Home Minister of State Ajay Mishra Teni in the Lok Sabha, stated that it has approved Phase II of the Inter-operable Criminal Justice System, for implementation till 2025-26, at a cost of ₹3,375 crore.

  • Machine to Machine seamless data exchange between the IT Systems for criminal justice.
  • Enhanced efficiency and timeliness in investigation.
  • Enabling a shift towards Smart Policing.
  • Enhanced data quality by reducing errors in data entry.
  • Move towards paper-less work systems.

Inter-operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS) provides for the “integration of data maintained by Police, Courts, Prosecution, Forensic Sciences Laboratories and Prisons to streamline workflow and a comprehensive search and query for timely and scientific investigation. ICJS is available for use by law enforcement agencies/officers in a secured network, a total of ₹168 crore has been released to states and union territories for the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project.

Fines on tyre companies for cartelisation

Q. The Rajya Sabha by CPI(M) Member of Parliament from Kerala John Brittas about fines on tyre manufactures by the Competition Commission of India (CCI).

A. Union Minister of State for Corporate Affairs Rao Inderjit Singh revealed that, The Competition Commission of India (‘Commission’) imposed penalties of Rs. 425.53 crores on Apollo Tyres Ltd., Rs. 622.09 crores on MRF Ltd., Rs. 252.16 crores on CEAT Ltd., Rs. 309.95 crores on JK Tyre and Industries Ltd., Rs. 178.33 crores on Birla Tyres Ltd. and Rs. 8.41 Lakh on their association i.e. Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association (ATMA) respectively.

Crimes against transgenders

Q. A question by a YSR Congress Member of Parliament from the Tirupati Lok Sabha Constituency upon Crimes against transgenders.

A. Union Home Ministry shared that in 2020, 236 cognizable offences under the Indian Penal Code were committed against transgenders.

Offences affecting the human body including murder, rape and unnatural offences, among others, accounted for an overwhelming majority of crimes (182) against transgenders.

Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has launched a scheme “SMILE – Support for Marginalized Individuals for Livelihood and Enterprise”, which includes sub-scheme ‘Comprehensive Rehabilitation for Welfare of Transgender Persons’. The focus of the sub-scheme is on rehabilitation, provision of medical facilities and intervention, counselling, education, skill development, economic linkages to the transgender persons. The sub-scheme also has a provision of Transgender Protection Cell under Director General of Police of every State/UT to monitor cases of offences against Transgender persons and to ensure timely registration, investigation and prosecution of such offences.

Today’s Legal Updates :-

  1. The Karnataka High Court will deliver its judgment today at 10.30 am in the petitions filed by female Muslim students against the ban imposed by certain colleges in the State on wearing hijab.
  2. Today the Karnataka High Court upheld a February 5 government order (GO) which effectively empowers colleges in the State to ban the wearing of hijab (headscarves) by Muslim girl students in college campus.  (Smt Resham v. State of Karnataka)
    • Hijab is not a part of essential religious practices of Islam.
    • Requirement of uniform is a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a).
    • The government has the power to pass the government order (GO), no case is made out for its invalidation.
  3. Today the Karnataka High Court has upheld the State government order (GO) of February 5 effectively empowering colleges to ban the wearing of hijab (headscarves) by Muslim girl students in educational institutions in the State.  (Smt Resham v State of Karnataka and Ors)
    1. A three-judge Bench of Chief Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi and Justices Krishna S Dixit and JM Khazi held that the hijab is not an ‘essential religious practice’ of Islam, and it was also not covered under the freedom of conscience.
    2. The Court also held that prescription of a school uniform is not violative of the rights of freedom of expression and of privacy, and is a reasonable restriction which is constitutionally permissible.
    3. it was held that the government has the power to issue the impugned Government Order (GO), and that the GO is valid.
    4. The Court noted that all was well with the dress code since 2004, and that there is scope for the argument that some ‘unseen hands’ have engineered social unrest and disharmony, and that the issue of hijab is generated and blown out of proportion.
      • “We are also impressed that even Muslims participate in the festivals that are celebrated in the ‘ashta mutt sampradāya’, (Udupi being the place where eight Mutts are situated). We are dismayed as to how all of a sudden that too in the middle of the academic term the issue of hijab is generated and blown out of proportion by the powers that be. The way, hijab imbroglio unfolded gives scope for the argument that some ‘unseen hands’ are at work to engineer social unrest and disharmony.”
      • Court said that, “We are not commenting on the ongoing police investigation lest it should be affected. We have perused and returned copies of the police papers that were furnished to us in a sealed cover. We expect a speedy & effective investigation into the matter and culprits being brought to book, brooking no delay,” 
      • What the chief architect of our Constitution observed more than half a century ago about the purdah practice equally applies to wearing of hijab there is a lot of scope for the argument that insistence on wearing of purdah, veil, or headgear in any community may hinder the process of emancipation of woman in general and Muslim woman in particular.
      • That militates against our constitutional spirit of ‘equal opportunity’ of ‘public participation’ and ‘positive secularism’. Prescription of school dress code to the exclusion of hijab, bhagwa, or any other apparel symbolic of religion can be a step forward in the direction of emancipation and more particularly, to the access to education. It hardly needs to be stated that this does not rob off the autonomy of women or their right to education inasmuch as they can wear any apparel of their choice outside the classroom.
    5. Whether wearing hijab/head-scarf is a part of ‘essential religious practice’ in Islamic Faith protected under Article 25 of the Constitution?
      • The Holy Quran does not mandate wearing of hijab or headgear for Muslim women. Whatever is stated in the above sūras, we say, is only directory, because of absence of prescription of penalty or penance for not wearing hijab, the linguistic structure of verses supports this view. This apparel at the most is a means to gain access to public places and not a religious end in itself. It was a measure of women enablement and not a figurative constraint.
      • Regard being had to the kind of life conditions then obtaining in the region concerned, wearing hijab was recommended as a measure of social security for women and to facilitate their safe access to public domain. At the most the practice of wearing this apparel may have something to do with culture but certainly not with religion, What is not religiously made obligatory therefore cannot be made a quintessential aspect of the religion through public agitations or by the passionate arguments in courts
      • It can hardly be argued that hijab being a matter of attire, can be justifiably treated as fundamental to Islamic faith. It is not that if the alleged practice of wearing hijab is not adhered to, those not wearing hijab become the sinners, Islam loses its glory and it ceases to be a religion. Petitioners have miserably failed to meet the threshold requirement of pleadings and proof as to wearing hijab is an inviolable religious practice in Islam and much less a part of ‘essential religious practice.
      • Conscience is by its very nature subjective. Whether the petitioners had the conscience of the kind and how they developed it are not averred in the petition with material particulars. Merely stating that wearing hijab is an overt act of conscience and therefore, asking them to remove hijab would offend conscience, would not be sufficient for treating it as a ground for granting relief.
      • No material is placed before us for evaluation and determination of pleaded conscience of the petitioners. They have not averred anything as to how they associate wearing hijab with their conscience, as an overt act. There is no evidence that the petitioners chose to wear their headscarf as a means of conveying any thought or belief on their part or as a means of symbolic expression. Pleadings at least for urging the ground of conscience are perfunctory, to say the least.
    6. Whether prescription of school uniform is not legally permissible, as being violative of petitioners Fundamental Rights inter alia guaranteed under Articles, 19(1)(a), [freedom of expression] and 21, (privacy) of the Constitution?
      • The idea of schooling is incomplete without teachers, taught and the dress code. Collectively they make a singularity. No reasonable mind can imagine a school without uniform. In civilized societies, preachers of the education are treated next to the parents. Pupil are under the supervisory control of the teachers. The parents whilst admitting their wards to the schools, in some measure share their authority with the teachers. Thus, the authority which the teachers exercise over the students is a shared ‘parental power.
      • School uniforms promote harmony and spirit of common brotherhood transcending religious or sectional diversities. This apart, it is impossible to instill the scientific temperament which our Constitution prescribes as a fundamental duty vide Article 51A(h) into the young minds so long as any propositions such as wearing of hijab or bhagwa are regarded as religiously sacrosanct and therefore, not open to question. They inculcate secular values amongst the students in their impressionable & formative years.
      • Ordinarily, liberties of a person stand curtailed inter alia by his position, placement and the like. The extent of autonomy is enormous at home, since ordinarily residence of a person is treated as his inviolable castle. However, in ‘qualified public places’ like schools, courts, war rooms, defence camps, etc., the freedom of individuals as of necessity, is curtailed consistent with their discipline & decorum and function & purpose.
      • It hardly needs to be stated that schools are ‘qualified public places’ that are structured predominantly for imparting educational instructions to the students. Such ‘qualified spaces’ by their very nature repel the assertion of individual rights to the detriment of their general discipline & decorum. Even the substantive rights themselves metamorphise into a kind of derivative rights in such places. These illustrate this: the rights of an undertrial detenue qualitatively and quantitatively are inferior to those of a free citizen.
      • Similarly, the rights of a serving convict are inferior to those of an undertrial detenue. By no stretch of imagination, it can be gainfully argued that prescription of dress code offends students’ fundamental right to expression or their autonomy. In matters like this, there is absolutely no scope for complaint of manifest arbitrariness or discrimination inter alia under Articles 14 and 15, when the dress code is equally applicable to all the students, regardless of religion, language, gender or the like. It is nobody’s case that the dress code is sectarian.
      • Reasons are not far to seek: firstly, such a proposal if accepted, the school uniform ceases to be uniform. There shall be two categories of girl students viz., those who wear the uniform with hijab and those who do it without. That would establish a sense of ‘social-separateness’, which is not desirable. It also offends the feel of uniformity which the dress-code is designed to bring about amongst all the students regardless of their religion & faiths.
      • The object of prescribing uniform will be defeated if there is non-uniformity in the matter of uniforms. Youth is an impressionable period when identity and opinion begin to crystallize. Young students are able to readily grasp from their immediate environment, differentiating lines of race, region, religion, language, caste, place of birth, etc. The aim of the regulation is to create a ‘safe space’ where such divisive lines should have no place and the ideals of egalitarianism should be readily apparent to all students alike,
      • In a given fact matrix, how a foreign jurisdiction treats the case cannot be the sole model readily availing for adoption in our system which ordinarily treats foreign law & foreign judgments as matters of facts. Secondly, the said case involved a nose stud, which is ocularly insignificantly, apparently being as small as can be. By no stretch of imagination, that would not in any way affect the uniformity which the dress code intends to bring in the class room.
    7. Whether the Government Order dated February 5, 2022 apart from being incompetent is issued without application of mind and further is manifestly arbitrary and therefore, violates Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution?
      • It is nobody’s case that the Government Circular is void ab initio and consequently, the School Betterment (Development) Committees are non est. They have been functioning since last eight years and no complaint is raised about their performance, nor is any material placed on record that warrants consideration of the question of their validity despite.
      • However, there may be some scope for the view that it is not desirable to have elected representatives of the people in the school committees of the kind, one of the obvious reasons being the possible infusion of ‘party-politics’ into the campus. This is not to cast aspersion on anyone. We are not unaware of the advantages of the schools associating with the elected representatives. They may fetch funds and such other things helping development of institutions. This apart, no law or ruling is brought to our notice that interdicts their induction as the constituent members of such committees.
      • Again we do not have any quarrel with the proposition of law. However, we are not convinced that the same is invocable for invalidating the Government Order, which per se does not prescribe any uniform but only provides for prescription in a structured way, which we have already upheld in the light of our specific finding that wearing hijab is not an essential religious practice and school uniform to its exclusion can be prescribed. It hardly needs to be stated that the uniform can exclude any other apparel like bhagwa or blue shawl that may have the visible religious overtones.
      • At times, regard being had to special conditions like social unrest and public agitations, governments do take certain urgent decisions which may appear to be knee-jerk reactions. However, these are matters of perceptions.
    8. Whether any case is made out for issuance of a direction for initiating disciplinary enquiry against respondent Nos.6 to 14 and for issuance of a Writ of Quo Warranto against respondent Nos.15 & 16?
      • The Court held that no case was made out for initiating a disciplinary enquiry against the respondents, and the prayer was rejected as it was not maintainable. For this writ, it should be demonstrated that the person holds a public post or public office, and the placements of the respondents concerned in the College Betterment (Development) Committee does not fill the public character required as a condition for the issuance of writ of quo warranto, the Court said while rejecting the prayer.
      • The Court also referred to International Conventions and emancipation of women, saying that there have been legislative and judicial processes to emancipate women from discrimination.
  4. Today Former Attorney General for India and Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi has said that he is “glad” with the Karnataka High Court verdict which upheld the ban on wearing hijab by Muslim women in educational institutions of the State.
    1. The senior lawyer stated that this issue was about the sanctity of uniform in schools and colleges, and that the time has come for a “common uniform across India.”
      • Please understand the sanctity of a uniform in school or college and the discipline must be maintained. These are just pernicious activities that sensationalise the community. High Court said some unseen hands were behind this when elections were approaching; this is not a case of religious practice. In any case, practice religion at home and you don’t have to carry everything to school. Imagine what will happen if every person says ‘I am wearing this and that to school’.
      • What kind of a uniformity will be there? This will create a wedge between different sections of the society by creating such things which impact impressionable minds. Such kinds of things are wrong, pernicious and ultimately, affect mutual disharmony and impact the cohesion and integrity of the nation. All schools must follow and impose discipline, and if necessary, it is better to implement a common uniform system that will ensure discipline.
    2. When asked if other religious attires would come under the axe of this verdict, especially turbans worn by Sikhs, the Senior Counsel stated that hijabs and turbans “cannot be equated.”
      • One cannot equate a turban with this and turbans have been worn for hundreds of years and this hijab business has just commenced just before the elections.
      • The ultras trying to harass women is also absolutely wrong and should have been curtailed with an iron hand. But one wrong cannot lead to another. So that was wrong and this is also wrong.
  5. Today A Special Leave Petition has been filed before the Supreme Court challenging the Karnataka High Court’s Hijab judgment which held that Hijab is not an essential religious practice of Islam and upheld the ban on wearing hijab in government schools and colleges.
    1. The plea has been field by Niba Naaz, a student from Karnataka through advocate Anas Tanwir.
      • failed to note that the right to wear a Hijab comes under the ambit of ‘expression’ and is thus protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
    2. It also contended that the High Court failed to take note of the fact that the right to wear Hijab comes under the ambit of the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
    3. With regard to uniform, the plea said that the Karnataka Education Act, 1983, and the Rules made under the same, do not provide for any mandatory uniform to be worn by students.
      • A perusal of the scheme of the Act reveals that it aims to regulate the institutions, rather than the students. Sections 3 and 7 of the said Act provide the State Government with the powers to inter alia regulate education, curriculum of study, medium of instruction, etc. However, neither of these provisions empowers the State Government to prescribe a uniform for the students.
      • there is no provision in the Act or the rules allowing the formation of a ‘college development committee’.
      • Such a committee, even if formed, has no powers to regulate the wearing of a uniform, or any other matter in an educational institution, it has been contended.
  6. Today the Delhi High Court directed the Central government to submit all the files related to fixing and lowering of cut-off percentiles in postgraduate (PG) medical courses for the current year.  (Dr Abhinav Kumar and Ors v Union of India and Anr)
    • “From the standpoint of doctors, the percentile system is unconstitutional because it debars qualified doctors which fall below the rank of 50 percentile to be considered in the merit list. In the present circumstances when there is urgent need of specialized doctors, consideration of PG courses beyond the 50 percentiles would allow the Respondent to fill up all seats which remain vacant year after year and reduce the shortage of specialized doctors across different hospitals across India,” 
    • “We are not suggesting that most incompetent people should be given admission. By all means qualify a percentage but by prescribing a percentile, you are limiting the number of people without even looking into their actual merit. You are looking at his relative merit instead. By talking of percentile, you are doing that only,” 
    • “You are trying to control the flow through percentile. That is the way to control the number of PG Doctors. But how can that be? You yourself have created the infrastructure for so many seats. You are entitled to maintain standards of medical education. You can say that we will not allow below 50%. But it cannot be that hundreds of seats remain vacant. You reduce the number of seats if you want this to continue.”
  7. Today the Karnataka High Court directed the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) to commence filling of potholes on a “war footing”, and finish all such road repairs within 15 days.  (Vijayan Menon v. Secretary and Anr)
  8. Today the Bombay High Court pulled up a lawyer for sending his junior for mentioning a case without adequately preparing her to respond to the queries of the Court.
    1. As is the practice in the Bombay High Court, lawyers who want to get their cases heard urgently, come with short applications giving brief details of the case, and seek listing of the matter either on the same day or a fixed date.
      • Justice Kathawalla remarked, “You send your junior. She says she does not know the matter. We ask her questions and she is at the receiving end,” 
      • “You appear in other matters in the morning; send your juniors here to take dates. But you are supposed to train your juniors well. You just send them here and then they are at the receiving end from us. That will demoralise them. You should train your junior well, she could be a very good lawyer,”
  9. Today the Delhi High Court requested the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to facilitate travel to Yemen of the family members of a woman from Kerala sentenced to death for the murder of a Yemeni national.  (Save Nimisha Priya International Action Council Through its Chairman v Union of India and Anr)
    • The High Court was dealing with a petition filed by an organisation, Save Nimisha Priya, seeking a direction to the Government of India to initiate negotiations with the family of the murdered victim so that her life can be saved by them paying blood money — the compensation paid by an offender or his kin to the family of the victim.
    • Now, the only way for her to escape from the death penalty is to gain pardon from the family of the deceased by paying blood money to the family in accordance with the law of land. It is come to know from the lawyer who represented her before the appeal court that the option for „blood money‟ is kept open by the appeal court.
    • If family of the victim agreed to pardon her by receiving blood money, the petitioner is unable to pay the same as financial transactions to Yemen are also restricted by the Indian authorities. The petitioner herein as well as the family of Nimisha Priya has made many representations / communications to respondents regarding the case of Nimisha Priya but did not receive any positive reply from them.
  10. Today the Delhi High Court asked the Delhi Police to fairly conduct its investigation into the death of 23-year-old Faizan, who was allegedly beaten up and forced to sing the National Anthem by some policemen during the Delhi Riots of February 2020.  (Kismatun v. State of NCT of Delhi Through Home Department and Ors)
    • I am not here to interfere in any manner with the investigation but if I see any hanky-panky in this report, I will interfere. The investigation has taken two years, one of the SIT is headed by you (DCP). We have no reason to disbelieve you. But I am directing you to investigate the matter without any influence.
    • His voice sample has been taken, but he was not the person beating them. We are examining the CCTV footage and other videos recorded of the area. We are investigating as to who were the men who beat them… So far as identification parade is concerned, this process will be done soon.
    • We have some technical evidence. We have zeroed in on one person who was there. His polygraph test was done. He was not seen beating. We have taken his voice sample. The evidence that we have are CCTV footages. All efforts are being made to investigate the incident.
    • They have zeroed in on one man. If there is a suspect, is there an arrest? Custodial interrogation is generally the chant by the State in other matters, but they have not even demanded that in this case. The question is who was accompanying that policeman? There is no murmur on that either.
  11. Today A Delhi court formally framed sedition and other charges, including those under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), against Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) student Sharjeel Imam in a Delhi riots case. (State v. Sharjeel Imam)
  12. Yesterday the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court took strong exception to government officials using their mobile phones in office for making personal phone calls or other purposes not related to their work. (DS Radhika v. The State)
    • In all circumstances, the mobile phones must be either switched off or kept in vibration/silent mode, without causing any disturbance or nuisance to the public, who all are attending the office as well as the other officials working in the office
    • If such indiscipline and misconduct are allowed to be continued, no doubt, they are committing a greatest sin to the public by getting tax payers’ money as huge salary.
  13. Yesterday the Meghalaya High Court stated that it would not be appropriate for courts and tribunals to say that they are ‘inclined to concur’ with Supreme Court judgments since the judgments by the top court are binding on all courts within the territory of India.
  14. Today the Bombay High Court refused interim relief to Maharashtra Cabinet Minister Nawab Malik in a case involving underworld don Dawood Ibrahim, While noting that his arrest was in compliance with provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA).
  15. Today the Chhattisgarh High Court echoed the legal principle that even an illegitimate son or daughter is entitled to compassionate appointment on death of their father. (Piyush Kumar Anchal v. State of Chhattisgarh)
  16. Punjab and Haryana High Court judge, Justice Ajay Tewari who was due to retire on April 6, 2022 has resigned from office, he is currently the second seniormost judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court after Chief Justice Ravi Shanker Jha.
  17. Today the Supreme Court granted interim relief to Malayalam news channel, MediaOne staying the Central government decision to revoke the channel’s security clearance.  (Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v Union of India)
  18. Today the Supreme Court quashed a first information report (FIR) registered against a tenant for non-payment of rent arrears.  (Neetu Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others)
  19. Today the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of parties submitting arguments to the Court in sealed covers, with Chief Justice of India (CJI) NV Ramana stating that the same cannot be condoned.
  20. A Delhi Court held that it was “persuaded” to give her a reprieve despite the embargoes under the an Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), while granting bail to Ishrat Jahan in a case related to the Delhi Riots. (Ishrat Jahan v. State)
  21. Today the Delhi High Court refused to entertain a public interest litigation petition seeking a high-level inquiry against the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, alleging that they have links with Khalistani separatists.  (Jagdish Sharma v Union of India and Ors)
  22. Today the Supreme Court was told that talks between Amazon and the Future companies had failed, and that Reliance was taking over the assets of the latter.
  23. The Supreme Court will tomorrow hear a plea moved by family members of the deceased in the Lakhimpur Kheri killings, seeking cancellation of bail to the prime accused, Ashish Mishra.
  24. Today the Bombay High Court rejected the plea by Maharashtra Cabinet Minister Nawab Malik seeking release from judicial custody in the money laundering case involving underworld don Dawood Ibrahim which is being investigated by the Enforcement Directorate (ED).
  25. Yesterday the Supreme Court observed that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 1908, the Court has to go through the entire plaint or pleadings and cannot reject the plaint by reading only few lines/passages and ignoring the other relevant parts.  (Sri Biswanth Banik and Another v. Smt. Sulanga Bose and Others)
  26. Yesterday the Bombay High Court directed district collectors and magistrate across Maharashtra to conduct a survey and identify areas where the instances of child marriages are prevalent. (Dr. Rajendra Burma v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.)
  27. Former Congress councillor from North-East Delhi Ishrat Jahan was arrested in March 2020 in connection with Delhi Riots case FIR No 59/2020 for the alleged commission of offences under provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, the Arms Act and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA).

Legal Prudent Fraternity